Abstract: We study novel and general restrictions allowing to design satisfactory ex post incentive compatible single valued direct mechanisms in interdependent values environments, characterized by the set of agents' type pro…les and by their induced preference pro…les. For environments that we call knit and strict, only constant mechanisms can be ex post (or interim) incentive compatible. For those called partially knit, ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and strategy-proofnes implies strong group strategy-proofness in private values environments. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss voting, assignment and auctions environments where our theorems apply.
Introduction
A major concern when designing economic mechanisms is to provide agents with incentives to reveal their true characteristics. Setting aside some obviously unsatisfactory solutions, it is well understood that attaining this objective is not always possible. Moreover, when it is, a con ‡ict often arises between the mechanism's e¢ ciency and its incentive compatibility. These generic statements hold for di¤erent formulations of the mechanism design problem, and for various concepts of equilibrium.
Hence, a mechanism can only meet attractive lists of desiderata if the class of problems to be dealt with is somewhat constrained. In social choice theory, where mechanisms are de…ned as functions whose domains are subsets of preference pro…les, these constraints on the relevant situations to be considered are called domain restrictions, in contrast to the notion of universal domain that was the basis of fundamental theorems like Arrow's or Gibbard and Satterthwaite's. Of course, some restricted domains may admit satisfactory mechanisms, and others not. But the analysis of domain restrictions provides a systematic tool to explore the frontiers between possibility and impossibility results.
The notion of domain restrictions is not always explicitly used in the larger literature on mechanism design. There, assumptions on what economic situations are within the scope of each model are usually predicated directly on the structure of the set of alternatives, or on the types of agents. Yet, when the problems to be dealt with remain in the world of private values and the analysis of incentives can focus on direct mechanisms, such assumptions also amount to restricting the set admissible preference pro…les.
However, in contexts where values are no longer private, but interdependent, the preferences of an agent at a given type pro…le are not fully determined by the type of the agent itself. In that general case, the incentives provided by a mechanism not only depend on the type pro…les in its domain, but also on the properties of the preference function associating a pro…le of agent's preferences to each type pro…le. We de…ne an environment as a pair formed by the set of admissible type pro…les and an associated preference function, and argue that what matters to determine whether an environment admits satisfactory mechanisms depends on how it is restricted. Restrictions on preference domains are a particular case of our general framework.
Starting from this enlargement in the scope of our restrictions, we focus attention on those that can be de…ned in general terms and do not depend speci…cally on assumptions regarding the structure of the alternatives or the speci…c form of agents'types. After careful examination of di¤erent models in the literature, we have concluded that many of them, although based on very di¤erent models and assumptions, can be examined from a common point of view. We are interested in unearthing the common features of families of environments, rather than those directly suggested by single applications. The restrictions on classes of environments that we are about to describe informally, and rigorously de…ne in the next section, underlie a variety of possibility and impossibility results arising in di¤erent …elds of application and models that look quite unrelated at …rst glance. Our purpose has been to extract what is common among those environments that give rise to impossibilities in these applications. Likewise, we have tried to identify the common features of environments that allow for positive results.
Speci…cally, we de…ne two classes of environments that we call knit and partially knit, respectively. Environments in each of these classes must meet requirements regarding the possibility to connect admissible pairs of type pro…les through sequences of changes in individual types, which are de…ned in reference to certain alternatives and through the use of the preference function. The set of pairs of type pro…les and reference alternatives for which the requirements must be met for an environment to be knit is larger than for it to be partially knit. Thus, the latter is a weaker condition.
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Of course, the two restricted environments that we consider are not the only ones that can be proposed in the same vein. But they allow us to illustrate the fact that, in order to draw the line between possibility and impossibility in mechanism design, what matters is not the size of environments, but rather the connections that can be established between the di¤erent potential situations that may arise as type pro…les do change.
Let's now describe the demands we impose on mechanisms, in order to consider them satisfactory. One …rst attractive and well-studied requirement is that of ex post incentive compatibility, guaranteeing truthful revelation of types to be a Nash equilibrium in all the games that result from any speci…cation of possible type pro…les. 2 We also introduce a second concept, that of ex post group incentive compatibility, under which truthful revelation is required to be a strong Nash equilibrium. These are our main target properties, and we can obtain possibility and impossibility results regarding them, for those environments that we call strict, where agents are never indi¤erent between alternatives.
In the general case where some agents may be indi¤erent among several alternatives, we need to use an additional condition that we call respectfulness. This condition, when applied to private values is a distant relative of non-bossiness (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981) , but much less demanding than this or other similar conditions analyzed in Thomson (2016) . It essentially rules out manipulations by one agent that could a¤ect others while not gaining anything in exchange, thus opening the way to bribes.
In order to prove that our methodological perspective has bite, we present results regarding environments that are knit or partially knit, respectively. Our purpose is illustrative, and we might have looked for other results, but we shall later explain our choice of questions. Two of the results we present are in the vein of impossibility theorems. Theorem 1 states that only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible and respectful in knit environments. Corollary 1 reaches the same conclusion for strict environments without need to invoke respectfulness, which trivially holds in that case. In fact, the results only apply to the case of interdependent values because, as we prove later on, no environment can be knit 1 The purpose of our introduction is to present the reader with a general roadmap. The details regarding what we exactly mean by the terms connecting pairs of type pro…les, or adequate conditions are provided in the formal de…nitions in Section 2, and clearly illustrated in the analysis of examples of applicatons in Appendix B. Similar caveats apply to other terms that may be used loosely here and will be made precise in the coming sections. 2 The study of incentive compatibility in Bayesian terms was started by d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) , and Arrow (1979) , and its appropriate formulation and results depend on the information that will be available to the agents at the time where the analysis is carried out. The case of interdependent values was …rst studied by D'Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1990) . The notion of ex post incentive compatibility corresponds to the time where agents have received all possible information, and can be de…ned without attributing cardinal utility to agents, as it does not require Bayesian update. See Jackson (2003) .
in the particular case of private values. The informed reader will observe that the conclusion of our theorem is the same that was obtained by Jehiel, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moldovanu, and Zame (2006) , but the analogy stops here. These authors focus on environments where preference pro…les will be represented by n-tuples of money-separable utility functions, and where the preference function is smooth, among other assumptions, while our restrictions apply to environments that do not have such characteristics. Also notice that, since we work with single valued direct mechanisms, our environments are separable in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005) , and their Corollary 1 applies: no mechanism is interim incentive compatible unless it is ex post incentive compatible. Because of that, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 have direct implications on the weaker interim notion, with no need to be explicit about agents'beliefs.
Our Theorem 2 contains a speci…c result for partially knit environments, which applies both in the case of interdependent and that of private values. It states that all respectful and ex post incentive compatible mechanisms for a partially knit environment will also be ex post group incentive compatible. Then, Corollary 2 reaches the same conclusion for strict environments without need to invoke respectfulness.
In contrast to the negative result we obtain for knit environments, the ones referring to partially knit domains show the door to the possibility of de…ning e¢ cient and incentive compatible mechanisms.
To see that, notice that ex post group incentive compatibility is a new, strong and attractive property, which not only excludes manipulation by groups of all sizes, but also implies, in particular, that mechanisms satisfying it are Pareto e¢ cient on their range. This may not be much to say in some cases: for example, if the range is small relative to the whole set of alternatives, or when the mechanism is dictatorial. But some partially knit environments admit full range and far from dictatorial Pareto e¢ cient mechanisms that are ex post incentive compatible, as we show through several examples.
It is also important to recall that, in the case of private values, ex post incentive compatibility is equivalent to strategy-proofness. Likewise, ex post group incentive compatibility becomes equivalent to strong group strategy-proofness. Hence, a corollary for the case of private values is that, under the conditions of our second theorem, individual and strong group strategy-proofness become equivalent. This parallels results that we obtained in Moreno (2010, 2016) connecting individual and weak group strategy-proofness.
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Let us again remark that our choice of results regarding the possibilities that arise when restricting attention to partially knit environments is just an illustration of the power of our approach. Yet, we argue that it is a powerful one, as it points to the fundamental issue whether e¢ ciency and incentive compatibility may be simultaneously be achieved, and when.
Our discussion has been abstract till now, but we already said that our results are based in a careful analysis of a variety of problems that arise in di¤erent settings. We illustrate this by providing examples of situations where our results apply. The situations we describe are simple, as examples must be, but chosen to highlight essential contributions to several …elds of application.
The examples come in pairs, to show that, with the same sets of type pro…les, but depending on the associated preference functions, one can cross the line between positive and negative results.
Two of them refer to deliberative juries and are inspired in our reading of Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) . Our second pair of examples address the problem of assigning indivisible objects, as in Che, Kim, and Kojima (2015) . The last two refer to auctions, following the trail of Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Jehiel, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moldovanu, and Zame (2006) .
We attach much importance to these examples for several reasons. One reason is that they show the unifying power of our approach. The models we get inspiration from look very di¤erent from each other, because they describe the types of agents in terms that are speci…c to each application. Yet our conditions and conclusions apply to all of them at a time. This is because we have arrived at the abstract formulation of our environments by scrutinizing what is common in the nature of these settings, and many others, for which results about ex post incentive compatibility and related concepts had been previously explored.
A second reason is that, in each of the applications, we can provide blood and ‡esh to the general and rather abstract notion of a preference function, by exhibiting how it is de…ned to …t the particulars of the case at hand.
A third and very important reason to present the examples in pairs is because they allow us to show that the frontier between worlds where impossibility prevails, and others where ex post incentive compatibility allows for a high degree of e¢ ciency can be surprisingly thin. For each one of our …elds of application, we present examples that look rather similar and yet belong to one of these worlds or to the other, depending on whether the preference function associated with a set of types leads to a knit environment or does not. Since knit environments are also partially knit, our Theorem 2 applies also there, if only to the constant function. But our examples clarify that attractive mechanisms may exist on partially knit environments.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next Section 2 we present the general framework and de…ne the restrictions on environments that we propose, and the kind of mechanisms we shall concentrate on. Section 3 contains the general results and their proofs. Section 4 provides examples of applications and ties them in with our general framework. Appendices A and B contain proofs of results presented in Section 2 and 4, respectively.
The model
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be a …nite set of agents with n > 2 and A be a set of alternatives.
Each agent i 2 N is endowed with a type i belonging to a set i . Each i includes all the information in the hands of i. We denote by = i2N i the set of type pro…les. A type pro…le is an n-tuple = ( 1 ; :::; n ) 2 that we will write as = ( C ; N nC ) when we want to stress the role of coalition C in N .
Let e R be the set of all complete, re ‡exive, and transitive binary relations on A and R i e R be the set of those preferences that are allowed for individual i. While R i 2 e R denotes agent i's preferences, let P i and I i be the strict and the indi¤erence part of R i , respectively.
Once type pro…les are fully determined, so are the agent's preference pro…les. We formalize this dependence through the notion of a preference function.
De…nition 1 Let be a set of types. A preference function R on , R : ! i2N R i , assigns a preferences pro…le R( ) to each type pro…le 2 .
We call R( ) = (R 1 ( ); :::; R n ( )) the preferences pro…le induced by the type pro…le while R i ( ) 2 R i stands for the induced preferences of agent i at . Notice that R i may be di¤erent for each agent. 4 As usual P i ( ) and I i ( ) denote the strict and the indi¤erence part of R i ( ), respectively. Note that the domain of the preference function R is a Cartesian product including all possible type pro…les, but its range may be a non-Cartesian strict subset of i2N R i .
An environment is a pair ( ; R) formed by a set of types and a preference function. Following standard use, private values environments are those where each agent's component of the preference function only depends on her type. That is, R i ( ) = R i ( i ; 0 N nfig ) for each agent i 2 N , 2 , and 0 N nfig 2 j2N nfig j . Otherwise, we are in interdependent values environments. In private values environments, abusing notation, we will write
In some private values environments, individual types can be identi…ed with their individual preferences. These are those where the preference function is biunivocal and establishes a one to one relationship between an agent's type and this agent's component of the preference function. Then, we can identify the environment with the set of preference pro…les and properly refer to the constraints on environments as domain restrictions.
Elements in the range of a preference function may be restricted to satisfy further conditions. In particular, if an environment ( ; R) is such that for all 2 and agent i 2 N , R i ( ) 2 R i is a strict preference, we will say that this environment is strict.
Our results refer to direct mechanisms. In fact, the properties we discuss are best analyzed with reference to the direct mechanism associated to any general one that might be described in terms of di¤erent message spaces and outcome functions.
A direct mechanism on is a function f : ! A such that f ( ) 2 A for each 2 . From now on, we drop the term "direct" and refer to mechanisms, without danger of ambiguity.
Notice that, by letting be the domain of f , we implicitly assume that all type pro…les within this set are considered to be feasible by the designer.
We shall now identify two important conditions on environments (De…nitions 5 and 6) that may or may not be satis…ed. Both conditions start by considering sequences of type pro…les that result from changing the type of individual agents, one at a time. These sequences are identi…ed in detail in De…nitions 5 and 6. Before that, we need some previous notation and de…nitions.
For any x 2 A and R i 2 e R, U (R i ; x) = fy 2 A : yR i xg is the upper contour set of R i at x and U (R i ; x) = fy 2 A : yP i xg is the strict upper contour set of R i at x. It will be useful to pay attention to the relationship between certain pairs of preferences.
De…nition 2 We say that
Equivalently, R 0 i is an x-monotonic transform of R i if there exists a subset of x's indifference class in R i , containing x, such that the relative position of its elements has weakly improved when going from R i to R 0 i .
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A special class of monotonic transforms that are easy to identify are those where two preference relations have exactly the same weak and strict upper contour sets for a given alternative x. Then we say that they are reshu-ings of each other, and each of the two preferences are, in particular, monotonic transforms of the other.
We are now able to de…ne the sequences of types relevant in the de…nitions of knit and of partially knit environments.
Let S = n S i(S;1) ; :::;
o be a sequence of individual types of length t S , such that for each h 2 f1; :::; t S g, S i(S;h) 2 i(S;h) . Agents may appear in that sequence several times or not at all. I(S) = fi(S; 1); :::; i(S; t S )g is the sequence of agents whose types appear in S and i(S; h) is the agent in position h in S.
Given 2 and S = n S i(S;1) ; :::; the passage from to 0 through S if m t S ( ; S) = 0 for 0 2 .
More informally, we say that leads to 0 through S. Notice that a given passage from to 0 through S induces a corresponding sequence of preference pro…les, R h ( ; S) = (R h 1 ( ; S); :::; R h n ( ; S)) 2 i2N R i for h 2 f0; 1; :::; t S g where for each agent i 2 N , we de…ne R h i ( ; S) R i m h ( ; S) 2 R i , that is, as the ith component of the preference function at the type pro…le m h ( ; S). We can now establish a condition on the connection between sequences of changes in type pro…les and the changes in preference pro…les that they induce by means of the preference function.
De…nition 4 Let x 2 A, ; 0 2 . We will say that the passage from to 0 through S is x-satisfactory if for each h 2 f1; :::
Notice that in the case of private values the order of individuals in S could be changed and the new sequence would still serve the same purpose. This is because the changes in the type of each agent only induce changes in the preferences of this agent. By contrast, the precise order of agents I(S) may be crucial in the case of interdependent values. We say that x is the reference alternative when going from to 0 . We use Example 1 to illustrate the concept of satisfactory and non-satisfactory passages in an interdependent values environment.
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Example 1 Let N = f1; 2g and A = fa; b; cg. Each agent i has two possible types: i = f i ; i g. The preference function R is de…ned in Table 1 . We write, in each cell, the preferences of both agents for a given type pro…le represented by an ordered list from better to worse, with parethesis in case of indi¤erences. Observe that agent 2's preferences over b and c depend on agent 1's type: bP 2 ( 1 ; 2 )c while cP 2 ( 1 ; 2 )b, that is, we are in an interdependent values environment. Table 1 . Preference function for Example 1. Notice that the range of R is not a Cartesian product, since R 1 = facb; bca; c(ab)g and R 2 = fb(ac)); a(bc); c(ab)g but the preferences pro…le (acb; a(bc)) are not in the range of the preference function R.
Let x = a, = ( 1 ; 2 ), 0 = ( 1 ; 2 ), and S = 2 ; 1 ; 2 a sequence of individual types. Note that, I(S) = f2; 1; 2g and t S = 3. We claim that the passage from to 0 through S is a-satisfactory. To show it, we have to check that for each h 2 f1; 2;
2 ), and R 3 i(S;2) ( ; S) = R 2 ( 1 ; 2 ). Then, using the table in Example 1, note that the following three facts hold:
is an a-reshu-ing of R 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) = c(ab) since both preferences coincide. Let x = a; = ( 1 ; 2 ), 0 = ( 1 ; 2 ), and S = 1 ; 2 a sequence of individual types. Note that, I(S) = f1; 2g and t S = 2. We claim that the passage from to 0 through S is not a-satisfactory. To show it, observe that for h = 1, R h i(S;h) ( ; S) is not an amonotonic transform of R h 1 i(S;h) ( ; S). By de…nition, R 0 i(S;1) ( ; S) = R 1 ( ) and R 1 i(S;1) ( ; S) =
Armed with our previous de…nitions we now identify our …rst restriction on environments.
De…nition 5 We say that an environment ( ; R) is knit if for any two pairs formed by an alternative and a type pro…le each, (x; ), (z; e ) 2 A , 6 = e , x 6 = z, there exist 0 2 and sequences of types S and e S, such that the passage from to 0 through S is x-satisfactory and the passage from e to 0 through e S is z-satisfactory.
Two important remarks are in order. First, whether or not an environment is knit will depend on the way how the preference function determines what sequences are considered to be satisfactory. Moreover, when going through proofs of knitness (see Remark 1, for example) the reader can observe that for some pairs formed by an alternative and a type pro…le each, there exist several type pro…les and passages that work. Knitness requires only the existence of one such way. The following remark provides an example of how to check whether an environment is knit.
Remark 1 The environment in Example 1 is knit.
To check that the environment ( ; R) where = ( 1 ; 2 ); ( 1 ; 2 ); ( 1 ; 2 ); ( 1 ; 2 ) is knit, we must prove that all pairs of alternatives and types can be connected through satisfactory sequences. To do that, we will show how to choose the appropriate ones for two speci…c cases, and then argue that all others can be reduced essentially to one of the patterns we shall follow. Case 1. (x; ) = (a; ( 1 ; 2 )) and (z; e ) = (b; ( 1 ; 2 )). De…ne 0 = e = ( 1 ; 2 ), S = 2 ; 1 ; 2 (thus, I(S) = f2; 1; 2g and t S = 3), e S = ? (thus, I( e S) = ? and t e S = 0). Note that since 0 = e , then e trivially leads to 0 through e S and this passage from e to 0 is b-satisfactory. We need to show that leads to 0 through S and the passage is a-satisfactory. For that we need to observe using Table 1 that the three (t S ) following facts hold:
Case 2. (x; ) = (c; ( 1 ; 2 )) and (z; e ) = (a; ( 1 ; 2 )). De…ne 0 = ( 1 ; 2 ), S = 1 ; 2 (thus, I(S) = f1; 2g and t S = 2), e S = 1 (thus, I( e S) = f1g and t e S = 1). As above, …rst we need to show that leads to 0 through S and the passage is a-satisfactory. For that we need to observe using Table 1 that the two (t S ) following facts hold: R 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) is a c-monotonic transform of R 1 ( 1 ; 2 ). Moreover, R 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) is a c-reshu-ing of R 2 ( 1 ; 2 ). Second, we need to show that e leads to 0 through e S and the passage is a-satisfactory. For that we need to observe using the table that R 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) is an a-monotonic transform of R 1 ( 1 ; 2 ). To …nish the proof of knitness we should consider all remaining combinations of (x; ), (z; e ) 2 A . Observe that each one of those cases can be embedded in either Case G1 or Case G2 below, which generalize Cases 1 and 2, respectively. Case G1. (x; ) and (z; e ) such that x 2 fa; bg. Case G2. (x; ) and (z; e ) such that x = c. To prove knitness for Case G1, consider 0 = e , e S = ?, and S will depend on and e . Similarly, to prove knitness for Case G2, consider 0 = ( 1 ; 2 ), S = 1 ; 2 (thus, I(S) = f1; 2g and t S = 2), and e S will depend on and e .
We shall now de…ne partially knit environments. This condition is less demanding that knitness because it only requires to connect some pairs of type pro…les, and only for some pairs of reference alternatives. Whether or not an environment is partially knit will again depend on how the preference function determines what sequences are satisfactory, but now the pairs of type pro…les and alternatives involved will be more limited.
For any 2 and x; z 2 A, let C( ; z; x) = fi 2 N : zR i ( )xg and C( ; z; x) = fj 2 N : zP j ( )xg.
De…nition 6
We say that an environment ( ; R) is partially knit if for any two pairs formed by an alternative and a type pro…le each, (x; ), (z; e ) 2 A , 6 = e , such that C( ; z; x) 6 = ;, #C( ; z; x) 2, and e j = j for any j 2 N nC( ; z; x), then there exist 0 2 and sequences of types S and e S, such that the passage from to 0 through S is x-satisfactory and the passage from e to 0 through e S is z-satisfactory.
Clearly, if an environment is knit it is also partially knit. Observe that since C( ; z; x) 6 = ?, then z 6 = x.
Notice that, here again, partial knitness is satis…ed as long as there is one satisfactory passage for each relevant pair of alternatives and pro…les.
A number of consequences of our de…nitions for private values environments follow. We start by the remark that essentially no such environment will be knit. The proof of Proposition 1 is found in Appendix A.
Proposition 1
No private values environment ( ; R) for which there exist i ; e i 2 i such that R i ( i ) 6 = R i ( e i ) for some i 2 N can be knit.
Propositions 2, 3, and 4 discuss the pertinence of our new properties for several important private values environments where the preference function is biunivocal.
We begin by the universal domain of strict preferences. The proof of Proposition 2 is found in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 The set of all strict preferences in the classical social choice problem is partially knit.
Another interesting case is provided by the set of strict single-peaked preferences on a …nite set of alternatives. We know that it is not knit by Proposition 1, but as stated in Proposition 3 and proven in Appendix A, it is partially knit.
Proposition 3
The set of all strict single-peaked preferences on a …nite set of alternatives in the classical social choice problem is partially knit.
In the housing problem, agents'admissible preferences over their individual assignment are strict. And, again, they de…ne a partially knit environment, as stated in Proposition 4 and proven in Appendix A.
Proposition 4
The set of preferences in the housing problem is partially knit.
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Until now, we have concentrated on the properties of potential environments. We now turn attention to some properties of the mechanisms themselves.
We …rst look at incentives. Ex post incentive compatibility requires, for all agents to prefer truthtelling at a given type pro…le , if all the other agents also report truthfully. Therefore, truthful revelation is required to be a Nash equilibrium.
De…nition 7 Let ( ; R) be an environment. A mechanism f is ex post incentive compatible in ( ; R) if, for all agent i 2 N , 2 , and
We say that an agent i 2 N can ex post pro…tably deviate under mechanism f at 2 if there exists
Note that ex post incentive compatibility requires that no agent can pro…tably deviate at any type pro…le.
In addition to individuals, coalitions of agents may also jointly deviate if they …nd it pro…table. This leads us to propose the following de…nition.
De…nition 8 Let ( ; R) be an environment. We say that a coalition C N can ex post pro…tably deviate under mechanism f at 2 if there exists
A mechanism f is ex post group incentive compatible in ( ; R) if no coalition of agents can ex post pro…tably deviate at any type pro…le.
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Finally, we may require our mechanisms to satisfy a condition that we call respectfulness. This is a condition similar to those imposed in the literature when dealing with environments where agents'preferences allow for non-degenerate indi¤erence classes (See Thomson, 2016) . Relative to other technical conditions of the same sort, ours is among the weakest, because it only applies to some limited changes in type pro…les, and has no bite in some important cases (for example, in public good economies where agents'preferences are strict). The condition essentially demands that for those speci…c changes in type pro…les, no agent should a¤ect the outcome (for her and for others) unless she changes her level of satisfaction.
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For short, we call this condition respectfulness. The following two Paretian notions of e¢ ciency will be used in our discussion of results.
De…nition 10 Let ( ; R) be an environment. A mechanism f is Pareto e¢ cient on the range in ( ; R) if for all 2 , there is no alternative x in the range of f such that xR i ( )f ( ) for all i 2 N and xP j ( )f ( ) for some j 2 N . If, in addition, the mechanism is onto A we say that it is fully e¢ cient in ( ; R).
Notice that ex post group incentive compatibility implies Pareto e¢ ciency on the range, since otherwise the grand coalition could pro…tably deviate.
The results
Our …rst result shows that only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible and respectful in knit environments. Before we prove the theorem, let's comment on its importance and implications. The conclusion of Theorem 1 is very strong, and it is in the same vein than the one in Jehiel, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moldovanu, and Zame (2006) obtain under completely di¤erent premises as we made explicit in the Introduction. The theorem also restricts attention to mechanisms that are respectful, but note that the latter requirement does not always have bite: It is irrelevant when the environment is strict, that is, when the preferences of all agents under all type pro…les are strict (see Corollary 1 below). Also observe that since we work with functions, our environments are separable, in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005) who also show (see their Proposition 2) that in this case only rules that are ex post incentive compatible could be interim incentive compatible. Therefore, our theorem also applies for the latter weaker requirement, whatever the priors of agents might be, and with no need to be speci…c about them.
Theorem 1 Let ( ; R) be a knit environment and f : ! A be a mechanism. If f is ex post incentive compatible and respectful, then f is constant.
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Corollary 1 Let ( ; R) be a strict knit environment and f : ! A be a mechanism. If f is ex post incentive compatible, then f is constant.
The proof of Corollary 1 is obtained using the …rst part in each step of the proof of Theorem 1 where respectfulness is not used. Some standard notation is required for the proof: For any x 2 A and R i 2 e R, L(R i ; x) = fy 2 A : xP i yg is the strict lower contour set of R i at x and E(R i ; x) = fy 2 A : yI i xg is the indi¤erence class of R i at x.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let ( ; R) be a knit environment and let f be an ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanism. Assume, by contradiction, that f was not constant. Then, there will be x; z 2 A, x 6 = z such that x = f ( ) and z = f ( e ) for some and e in . Since ( ; R) is knit, for the two pairs formed by an alternative and a type pro…le, (x; ) and (z; e ) 2 A , there exist 0 2 and two sequences S = f S i(S;1) ; :::; g such that the passage from to 0 through S is x-satisfactory and the passage from e to 0 through e S is z-satisfactory. Now, we will show the following: (a) for each h 2 f1; :::; t S g, f (m h ( ; S)) = x, and (b) for each h 2 f1; :::; t e S g, f (m h ( e ; e S)) = z. Statements in (a) and (b) yield to a contradiction. By de…nition of the sequences S and e S, we know that
S ( e ; e S)) = z by (b). We prove (a) in steps, from h = 1 to h = t S . The proof of (b) is identical and omitted.
Step
i(S;1) ( ; S); x , we would get a contradiction to ex post incentive compatibility since i(S; 1) would ex post pro…tably deviate under f at (
By (1) and (2) we have that f (m
i(S;1) ( )x contradicting ex post incentive compatibility since i(S; 1) would ex post pro…tably deviate under f at via S i(S;1) ). Thus, by (3) and (4) we have that f (m 1 ( ; S)) 2 E R 0 i(S;1) ( ; S); x . (5) Then, by respectfulness, we get that f (m 1 ( ; S)) = f (m 0 ( ; S)) = f ( ) = x which ends the proof of (a) for h = 1.
Step h 2 f2; :::; t S g. By repeating the same argument than in Step 1 on the recursive fact that f (m h 1 ( ; S)) = x, we obtain that f (m h ( ; S)) = f (m h 1 ( ; S)) = x.
We now prove our second result, showing the equivalence between ex post individual and group incentive compatibility in partially knit environments. This result has bite for both private and interdependent values environments.
Theorem 2 Let ( ; R) be a partially knit environment and f be a respectful mechanism. Then, f is ex post incentive compatible if and only if f is ex post group incentive compatible.
Corollary 2 Let ( ; R) be a strict partially knit environment and f be a mechanism. Then, f is ex post incentive compatible if and only if f is ex post group incentive compatible.
Before we prove the theorem, let us discuss its content and implications. A …rst consequence of ex post group incentive compatibility is Pareto e¢ ciency on the mechanism's range. Hence, the implications that having a good performance regarding incentives may be compatible with e¢ ciency is an invitation to investigate those cases where this may be a promising possibility.
Also observe that in private values cases where environments are partially knit (see Propositions 2, 3, and 4, for example), the result in Theorem 2 admits a second reading. This is because ex post incentive compatibility then becomes equivalent to strategy-proofness, 13 since each agent i's preferences depend on only through i . For the same reason, ex post group incentive compatibility becomes equivalent to strong group strategy-proofness. These remarks lead us to the following corollary.
Corollary 3 Let ( ; R) be a partially knit environment in private values and let f be a respectful mechanism. Then, f is strategy proof if and only if f is strongly group strategyproof.
The equivalence between individual and group ex post incentive compatibility may hold in rather vacuous ways, because there are cases where the only ex post incentive compatible rules lack any interest. But there are other cases where there is a real possibility of making these desiderata compatible in non-trivial ways.
Here are three relevant examples of mechanisms for which the result holds non-trivially in private values environments. One of them is the family of social choice functions de…ned on the set of all strict single-peaked preferences (see Moulin, 1980 and our Proposition 3) . The other case is provided by the top trading cycle mechanism for house allocation (see Shapley and Scarf, 1974 and our Proposition 4) . Finally, consider the large class of nontrivial strategy-proof rules on the set of all strict preferences that one can de…ne when only two alternatives are at stake (see Manjunath 2012) . In all three cases we are dealing with partially knit private values environments where a type for an agent can be identi…ed with her preference relation, the mechanisms are individual and strongly group strategy-proof, and by no means trivial. Also remark that for the case where the mechanism has more than two alternatives on the range, only dictatorship is strategyproof on the universal set of preferences, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (see Gibbard, 1973 and Satterthwaite, 1975) . This is an example in which our Theorem 2 also applies, 13 We say that a mechanism f is weakly group manipulable at 2 if there exist a coalition C N and
A mechanism f is strongly group strategy-proof in an environment ( ; R) if f is not weakly group manipulable at any 2 . When the condition is imposed only on singleton coalitions C = fig , we say that f is strategy-proof (also called dominant strategy incentive compatible). In words, strategy-proofnes requires that all agents prefer truthtelling at a given type pro…le , whatever all the other agents report.
since the universal set of preferences is partially knit and dictatorships are strongly group strategy-proof, but we use it here as a warning sign that the implications of Theorem 2, as already explained may or may not be of interest depending on the environments. 14 Proof of Theorem 2. Let ( ; R) be a partially knit environment and let f be a respectful mechanism. By de…nition, ex post group incentive compatibility implies ex post incentive compatibility. To prove the converse, suppose, by contradiction, that there exist 2 , C N , #C 2, e C 2 i2C i such that for any agent i 2 C, f ( e C ; N nC )R i ( )f ( ) and f ( e C ; N nC )P j ( )f ( ) for some agent j 2 C. Let z = f ( e C ; N nC ) and x = f ( ). Note that (i) z 6 = x, (ii) C( ; z; x) 6 = ?, #C( ; z; x) 2 since C C( ; z; x), and (iii) e j = j for any j 2 N nC( ; z; x) again since C C( ; z; x). Since ( ; R) is partially knit and conditions in De…nition 6 are satis…ed, there exist 0 2 and two sequences of types S = f S i(S;1) ; :::; g such that the passage from to 0 through S is x-satisfactory and the passage from e to 0 through e S is z-satisfactory. Although these sequences are not necessarily the same than the ones we used in the proof of Theorem 1, from this point on, we can use the same reasoning as there, and show that (a) for each h 2 f1; :::; t S g, f (m h ( ; S)) = x, and (b) for each h 2 f1; :::; t e S g, f (m h ( e ; e S)) = z, again leading to a contradiction. Adding the arguments we have already used in the proof of Theorem 1 we would complete the one for the present theorem.
Applications
In this section we present examples of simple environments where our theorems apply.
These examples are inspired in our reading of several relevant papers in the literature. They are framed in the language we have developed in our paper, and they allow us to clarify several of the points we try to make all along.
Examples 2 and 3 refer to deliberative committees and are inspired by our reading of Austen- Smith and Feddersen (2006) , who build on the classical Condorcet jury problem and add the possibility that agents share (true or false) information.
Examples 4 and 5 refer to house allocation problems and are this time inspired by the analysis of Che, Kim, and Kojima (2015) , regarding the existence of Pareto e¢ cient and ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms in that context. Examples 6 and 7 refer to auctions and are inspired by some of the models in Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Jehiel, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moldovanu, and Zame (2006) .
Until now we have analyzed our environments in abstract terms, and have not discussed the origin of the preference function, which indicates what is the relevant preferences pro…le associated to each pro…le of types. In Example 1 adapted from Example 1 in Bergemann and Morris (2005) , the preference function is proposed without any speci…c explanation regarding where this function comes from. Indeed, this is common to di¤erent general discussions of the issues we address here, and digging on the underlying reasons to predicate a given preference function is immaterial for the validity of our theorems. Notice, however, that whether or not an environment is knit, or partially knit, will depend on the preference function that applies in each case, for environments that are otherwise identical. Hence, it is interesting to know, for each application, whether or not the underlying phenomenon we want to model is adequately represented by a speci…c preference function.
In most applications, authors endow agents with a general utility function 15 that may depend on variables that re ‡ect the agent's type and, in the interdependent values case, on other variables that correspond to the types of the rest of agents. Our general framework has departed from this formulation, since we stick to a purely ordinal framework and avoid the use of utility functions. This has allowed us to de…ne restrictions on environment that transcend the details of any particular functional form and avoid questions of representability. Since in this section we want to get closer to well studied issues, we also become precise about the form of preference functions, based on the interpretation of each model. That will allow us to show that the choice of preference functions crucially determines whether an environment of application is knit, or partially knit, and has implications on the possibilities of design.
Deliberative Juries
Example 2 A three-person jury N = f1; 2; 3g must decide over two alternatives: whether to acquit (A) or to convict (C) a defendant under a given mechanism. The defendant is either guilty (g) or innocent (i). Each juror j gets a signal s j = g or s j = i.
Jurors's preferences arise from combining the di¤erent signals they obtain from the deliberation, according to their bias in favor of acquittal in view of their observed signals and of those declared by others. In this example, jurors are either high-biased (h) or low-biased (l). High-biased jurors (h) prefer to convict if and only if all other jurors declare the guilty signal and they have also observed it (s = (g; g; g)), whereas low-biased ones (l) prefer to convict if and only if they have observed the guilty signal or at least one other committee member has declared it (s 6 = (i; i; i)).
Each juror j's type is j = (b j ; s j ) 2 j = B S where B = fh; lg and S = fg; ig. A type pro…le 2 = (B S) n . Let CA denote the preference to convict rather than to acquit and AC be the converse order. The preference function is de…ned such that for each type pro…le 2 and for each juror j 2 N , R j ( ) is as follows:
CA if either b j = h and s = (g; g; g) or b j = l and s 6 = (i; i; i), AC, otherwise.
The environment ( ; R) in this example is knit. Hence we know by Theorem 1 that it will be impossible to design non-constant, ex post incentive compatible, and respectful mechanisms in such framework.
The proof that the environment is knit is in Proposition 5 in Appendix B. Here we simply provide the reader with some hints on the techniques that we use to check for our restrictions in this example and subsequent ones.
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To check knitness for a particular pair of types and alternatives, (A; ) and (C; e ), we must show that there are passages to a third type pro…le 0 which are A-satisfactory from and C-satisfactory from e , respectively.
Consider the following three type pro…les, = ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) = ((l; g); (h; g); (l; i)), e = ( e 1 ; e 2 ; e 3 ) = ((l; g); (h; g); (l; g)) and 0 = (
The pro…les of preferences they induce are shown in Table 2 . Table 2 : Agents'preferences induced by , e , and 0 , respectively.
As shown in Table 3 , it is possible to sequentially move from to 0 by successively changing, one by one, the type of the agents as follows. First, agent 1 from (l; g) to (h; i), then agent 2 from (h; g) to (h; i) and …nally agent 1 from (h; i) to (l; i). According to our notation, I(S) = f1; 2; 1g. Likewise, as shown in Table 4 , we can move from e to 0 by successively changing, one by one, the type of some agents. First, agent 1, then agent 3 and …nally agent 2, all from signal g to i, while their b's remain …xed. That is, I( e S) = f1; 3; 2g. In Table 3 , alternative A either does not change its relative position (an A-reshu-ing), or improves it (an A-monotonic transform). Similarly, in Table 4 , the same requirements are satis…ed but this time for alternative C. For instance, if juror 1 is unswerving she will prefer to convict if either (g; g; g), (g; g; i), or (g; i; g) but if juror 2 is unswerving she will convict if either (g; g; g), (g; g; i), or (i; g; g) ).
Yet being median is the same for both agents, they will prefer to convict if either (g; g; g), (g; g; i), (g; i; g), or (i; g; g).
Each juror j's type is j = (b j ; s j ) 2 j = B S where B = fu; mg and S = fg; ig. A type pro…le 2 = (B S)
n . The preference function is de…ned such that for each type pro…le and for each juror j 2 N , R j ( ) is as follows:
CA if either b j = u, s j = g and s l = g for some l 6 = j, or b j = m and # fl 2 N : s l = gg 2, and AC otherwise.
= ;
This environment ( ; R) is partially knit (see Proposition 6 in Appendix B) but not knit. To show that it is not knit, we present a family of mechanisms, the quota rules, that are non-constant, respectful, and ex post incentive compatible in ( ; R).
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Let q 2 f1; 2; 3g. A voting by quota q mechanism, f , chooses C for a type pro…le if and only if at least q agents have induced preferences from such that C is preferred to A. In Table 5 below we describe all possible results of voting by quota for di¤erent values of q in Example 3. We have four matrices, one for each type of agent 3. In the rows of each matrix we write the four types of agent 1 and in the columns the four types of agent 2. In each cell, we write each agent's best alternative according to their preferences at a given type pro…le, followed by the outcome of a quota mechanism. When two outcomes appear in a cell, the one in the left stands for the outcome of voting by quota 3 and the right one is the outcome for both quota 1 and 2, which in this example are always the same.
Given Table 5 , it is easy to check that these rules are ex post incentive compatible. In addition, they also satisfy anonymity. Now, Theorem 2 will ensure that these and other mechanisms that we may know to be ex post incentive compatible for our example will also be ex post group incentive compatible (therefore, Pareto e¢ cient on the range) since the environment is partially knit. Thus, full e¢ ciency is satis…ed in this example because the range of the mechanism is the set of alternatives.
17 Note that respectfulness is trivially satis…ed in these environments where preferences are strict and alternatives have no private component.
18 See Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) and Barberà and Jackson (2004) for papers where these rules are analized. Table 5 . Each agent's best alternative and outcomes of all voting by quota mechanisms.
Private goods without money
Example 4 Let N = f1; 2g be a set of agents, O = fa; cg be a set of objects. Each agent must be assigned one and only one object. Thus, the set of alternatives is A = fx = (a; c); z = (c; a)g, where the …rst component refers to the object that agent 1 gets. There is no money in this economy. The type i 2 i of each agent i is given by a signal s i in i = [0; 1]. Each individual i 2 N is endowed with a given auxiliary function g i : ! R increasing in both signals.
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The preference function R is such that for each agent i 2 N and for each type pro…le 
Example 5
We consider the framework of Example 4, except that we change agents'preference functions to be induced by g 1 (s) = min median and g 2 (s) = 19 Che, Kim, and Kojima (2015) also impose the following property which they call the single-crossing property:
for any 2 . However, as they already mention, this condition is not required for the impossibility result to hold. , respectively. That is, for each agent i 2 N and for each type pro…le 2 , R i ( ) is as follows: x is at least as good as z if and only if g i (s) 0.
The main but signi…cant di¤erence between this example and the preceding one is that now the functions g i are just weakly increasing.
Like in Example 3 above, the environment in this example is partially knit (see Proposition 8 in Appendix B) but not knit. To prove it, we consider the veto mechanisms de…ned below. Before introducing them we need the following de…nition: consider a partition of the signal (type) space and a useful graphical representation of it which is similar to the one de…ned in Che, Kim, and Kojima (2015) .
Let fS ac , S ca , S aa , S cc , S 0 g be the partition of where: S 0 is the set of signal pro…les for which both agents are indi¤erent between a and c, S ac is the set of signal pro…les for which agent 1 prefers a to c, agent 2 prefers c to a, and the preferences are strict for at least one agent, S ca is equally de…ned after changing the roles of c and a, S aa is the set of signal pro…les for which both agents prefer a to c, and S cc is equally de…ned after changing the roles of c and a.
In terms of alternatives, when the signals are in S ac both agents prefer x to z, when they are in S ca both prefer z to x, in S aa , 1 prefers x over z and 2 prefers z over x, in S cc , 1 prefers z over x and 2 prefers x over z, and in S 0 both are indi¤erent between x and z. Now we say that a mechanism f veto x is a veto rule for x if for any type pro…le the outcome is agent 1's best alternative when it is unique, and it is agent 2's best alternative otherwise. In view of Theorem 1 the existence of these non-constant, ex post incentive compatible, and respectful mechanisms implies that the environment is no longer knit (in Lemma 1, Appendix B we show that veto rules satisfy the three properties). Now, Theorem 2 will ensure that these and other mechanisms that we may know to be ex post incentive compatible for our example will also be ex post group incentive compatible (therefore, Pareto e¢ cient on the range) since the environment is partially knit. Thus, full e¢ ciency is obtained in this example since the range is the whole set of alternatives.
Auctions
There is one unit of an indivisible good to be auctioned. Let N be the set of buyers (agents). An alternative in this model tells us which single agent, if any, gets the good and what positive price she pays for it, meaning then that the rest of agents do not get the good and pay zero. If no agent gets the good, no one pays anything. Formally, an alternative x is written as x = (x 1 ; :::x n ) 2 A = (f0; 1g R + ) n , with x i = (a i ; p i ) where a i = 1 and p i > 0 if and only if agent i gets the good, and p l = 0 for all agents l that do not get it.
We assume that agents'preferences are sel…sh. Agents only care about whether or not they are awarded the good and, if so, about how much they must pay for it. Therefore, we can de…ne their preferences on the part of the alternative that concerns them and then naturally extend such preferences to alternatives.
The type i of each agent i is given by a signal, s i 2 i R (where i has a minimum). Each individual i 2 N is endowed with a given auxiliary function g i : ! R non-decreasing in her own signal s i . The preference function R is such that for each agent i 2 N and for each type pro…le 2 , R i ( ) is as follows:
(1) (1; p i )P i (s)(1; q i ) for all q i > p i (agent i strictly prefers paying less than more), and (2) (1; g i (s))I i (s)(0; 0) (agent i is indi¤erent between not getting the good and paying nothing or receiving the good and paying g i (s)).
Notice that g i (s) is buyer i's valuation of the good, g i has a minimum in i , and that the preference relation of i is fully determined once we know which alternative (1; g i (s)) is indi¤erent to (0; 0).
We assume all along this section that for each agent i, g i satis…es the following standard condition in the literature: (a) g i is non-decreasing in s i .
Example 6 Let us assume that, in addition to condition (a), for any agent i, the evaluation will be the lowest possible if all other agents but i receive the lowest signal. This is formally expressed by condition: (b) g i (s) = g i (s) for s such that s j = s j for all j 2 N nfig.
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Under conditions (a) and (b), the environment in this example is knit 21 (see Proposition 9 in Appendix B). Hence, again by Theorem 1 we know that it will be impossible to design non-constant, ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms in such framework. This negative result parallels those in Examples 2 and 5 above, where Theorem 1 also applies.
One could wonder whether it would be possible to …nd non-constant mechanisms by dropping the requirement of respectfulness. We do not have a full answer to this question, but the answer is negative if we substitute condition (a) by the stronger condition (c) g i is strictly increasing in s j for all j 2 N , and the requirement that the good is always allocated. (See Proposition 10 in Appendix B.) Now, Example 7 and our subsequent remarks will explore the positive consequences of apparently small changes in the preference function.
Example 7 For simplicity, let N = f1; 2g, i = f0; 1g for all i 2 N and l; m; h 2 R + with 0 = l < m < h. The agent's preference function is de…ned as in the general framework but will now be based on a di¤erent auxiliary function that takes three possible values, low, medium and high. 20 An example of a g i function satisfying these properties is presented by Jehiel, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moldovanu, and Zame (2006). In our notation, consider the case where
> 0 and the signal space is S i = [0; 1]. Note that by …xing i and , we have a unique preference formation rule for each agent. 21 Our examples are chosen to illustrate our points, and the readers may want to create additional ones or to use them for comparison with alternative results. Take, for instance, the function g i (s) = maxfs 1 ; :::; s n g, that is used in Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle (2010) , for other purposes. Such auxiliary function g i satis…es condition (a) but not (b), and it could be used to de…ne a knit (hence, also partially knit) environment. Since our purpose is only to provide some examples, we leave the possibility of constructing new ones based on this g i to the interested readers. Observe that for each agent i, g i satis…es (a) and the following condition: (d) g i is non-increasing in s j , for all j 2 N nfig.
Condition (d), in contrast to the cases encompassed in Proposition 10 and to some cases in Example 6, establishes that the valuation of the good by agent i depends negatively on other agents'signals. Note also that the function g i in Example 7 does not satisfy condition (c). Now, we assert that the environment in this example is not knit, but is partially knit (see Proposition 11 in Appendix B). Therefore, we can apply Theorem 2 and conclude that any ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanism on that environment will also be ex post group incentive compatible, and therefore, Pareto e¢ cient on the range.
In view of Theorem 1, to prove that is not knit, it is enough to show that the environment admits a non-constant, ex post incentive compatible, and respectful mechanism. Here is such a mechanism.
22 Let l < p < m and l < p 0 < m. Let f p;p 0 be such that no agent gets the good if both signals are 0, agent 1 gets the good and pays p if her signal is 1, and agent 2 gets the good and pays p 0 , otherwise. Formally, for 2 = f0; 1g f0; 1g, 
= ;
Let us complete the discussion of this and related examples with some additional comments. Example 7 provides a scenario where to apply Theorem 2, which is based on the assumption that changes in some agent's signal induce reverse e¤ects in the preferences of the di¤erent participants in the auction. While we can think of environments and signals where this can be the case, the assumption that prevails in the literature on auctions is that all agents respond in the same direction to changes in some agent's signal. Led by this observation, we o¤er the reader the following additional remark (that is formally justi…ed in Appendix B).
Remark 2 If we just modify Example 7 and assume that all agents'preferences respond in the same way positively to changes in signals, we can prove the existence in such setting of a mechanism that is respectful, and individually but not group ex post incentive compatible. Hence, this new speci…cation leads to environments that are not partially knit.
Discussion
In this paper we have emphasized the crucial role of environments, that is, combinations of a set of types and a preference function, in determining whether or not satisfactory ex post incentive compatible mechanisms can be designed.
Our classi…cation of environments is not based on speci…c assumptions about preferences, or the structure of the space of alternatives, or other considerations that end up determining what combinations of types are admissible in speci…c applications. Rather, we have extracted from di¤erent possible special cases what we think are crucial aspects that distinguish some environments from others. These characteristics refer to how di¤erent type pro…les are interconnected within a given set by means of the preference function.
We model the preferences of agents as binary relations, and conduct our analysis in ordinal terms.
Our conditions do not refer speci…cally to the structure of the set of types, or to its dimensionality. Since the distinction between one-dimensional and multidimensional signals is often seen as being determinant for the possibility or impossibility of designing e¢ cient mechanisms with good incentive properties, our results suggest that this criterion, however important, needs not always be determinant.
Appendix A
In this appendix we prove propositions stated in Section 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let i 2 N and i ; e i 2 i , i 6 = e i be such that R i ( i ) 6 = R i ( e i ). That is, R i ( i ; N nfig ) 6 = R i ( e i ; N nfig ) for all N nfig 2 j2N nfig j since ( ; R) is a private values environment. Then, there will be a pair of alternatives, say x and z, such that xP i ( i )z and zR i ( e i )x (otherwise, for i ; e i 2 i , R i ( i ) = R i ( e i )). To show that the set of types is not knit, we prove that for the two pairs (x; ( i ; N nfig )), (z; ( e i ; N nfig )), and whatever N nfig , there does not exist any 0 , S, and e S such that the passage from to 0 through S be x-satisfactory and the passage from e to 0 through e S be z-satisfactory. We prove it by contradiction. Suppose otherwise that there exist , S , e S , such that the passages
and
from to through S and e to through e S are x and z-satisfactory, respectively. Since we are in a private values environment, changes in the type of agent j never a¤ect the induced preferences of other agents, in particular never a¤ect i's induced preferences if j 6 = i. Moreover, we know that xP i ( i ; N nfig )z and zR i ( e i ; N nfig )x. These two observations imply that agent i must belong to I(S ) [ I( e S ). That is, i will appear in at least one of these two sequences. We concentrate on the steps of the passage where agent i changes her type and we show that there is no compatible with x-satisfactory and z-satisfactory passages from to and from e to . Without loss of generality, by the remark just after De…nition 4, we can assume that all types of agent i in S and e S appear in the …rst positions in these sequences. Let's de…ne I S ;i fh 2 f1; 2; :::; i S g : i(S ; h) = ig and I e S ;i = n h 2 1; 2; :::; i e ( ; e S ) = i . As mentioned above, changes in types of agents di¤erent from i will not change agent i's preferences. Thus, we have obtained the desired contradiction. On the one hand that xP i ( )z and on the other hand, that zR i ( )x.
Proof of Proposition 2. Two relevant observations: Remember that types are preferences, in that case, that is, i = R i 2 R i = i for each i 2 N . Moreover, changes in j's preferences do not a¤ect i's preferences if i 6 = j. Let U denote the universal set of strict preferences in the classical social choice problem. Thus, R i = U. To check for partial knitness , take any (x; R), (z; e R) 2 A U n such that C(R; z; x) = C(R; z; x) 6 = ?, #C(R; z; x) 2, and e R j = R j for all j 2 N nC(R; z; x). Without loss of generality, let C(R; z; x) = f1; 2; :::; cg where c denotes its cardinality. Construct S, e S and R 0 satisfying the condition in partially knitness. We shall denote, for each R i 2 U, let R 
Proof of Proposition 3. The same two observations as in the proof of Proposition 2 apply: types are preferences, that is, i = R i 2 R i = i for each i 2 N . Moreover, changes in j's preferences do not a¤ect i's preferences if i 6 = j. Let A be a …nite and ordered set of alternatives in R, the real line. For all i 2 N , let R i = S be the set of strict single-peaked preferences on A according to the established real numbers order. We introduce some notation: Given R j 2 S, p(R j ) denotes the peak, that is, the best alternative, of R j in A. Let L(R i ; x) = fy 2 A : xP i yg be the strict lower contour set of R i at x. Given R j 2 S and x 2 A, de…ne r(R j ; x) as the …rst alternative in L(R j ; x) in the opposite side of alternative x with respect to p(R j ).
To check for partial knitness, take any (x; R), (z; e R) 2 A S n such that C(R; z; x) = C(R; z; x) 6 = ?, #C(R; z; x) 2, and e R j = R j for all j 2 N nC(R; z; x). Without loss of generality, let x < z, which implies that p(R j ) > x. Also without loss of generality, let C(R; z; x) = f1; 2; :::; cg where c denotes its cardinality. Now de…ne S = e S = C(R; z; x) = f1; 2; :::; cg and construct for each agent j 2 f1; 2; :::; cg, R 0 j depending on the cases below. Take any j 2 C(R; z; x) and consider the following cases. Case 1. e R j is such that x e P j z. Take R 0 j 2 S such that p(R 0 j ) 2 [x; z), r(R j ; x) = z, and zP 0 j y for all y < x. Notice that such R 0 j exists, and the two following set inclusions hold:
j is both an x-monotonic transform of R j and a z-monotonic transform of e R j (observe that with strict preferences, the above inclusion of strict lower contour sets is equivalent to De…nition 2). Case 2. e R j is such that z e P j x. Consider several subcases. Case 2.1.
j ; x) = r(R j ; x) and r(R 0 j ; z) r( e R j ; z). By de…nition of single-peakedness, such prefer-
and r(R 0 j ; z) r( e R j ; z). By de…nition of single-peakedness, such preferences R 0 j exists. Then, observe that R 0 j de…ned in (a) and (b) is both an x-monotonic transform of R j and a
, otherwise, a similar argument would work.
This implies that either (a) r(R j ; x) 2 z; p( e R j )
hold. Finally, for each j 2 C(R; z; x) we repeat the same argument.
Proof of Proposition 4. The same two observations as in the proof of Propositions 2 and 3 apply: types are preferences, that is, i = R i 2 R i = i for each i 2 N . Moreover, changes in j's preferences do not a¤ect i's preferences if i 6 = j. The proof follows the same argument as the one in Proposition 2, given that agents have all possible strict preferences over individual assignments and preferences are sel…sh. As in Barberà, Berga, and Moreno (2016) , just note that although preferences over individual assignments are strict, preferences over alternatives allow for indi¤erences, by sel…shness: all alternatives with the same individual assignment are indi¤erent for such individual agent. Thus, in the case of housing C(R; z; x) C(R; z; x) holds and R z i are the preferences obtained by lifting z and also all alternatives with the same individual assignment z i to the …rst position and keep the relative position of all other alternatives.
Appendix B
In this appendix we present some aspects of the applications in Section 4 with more detail, in order to prove knitness or partially knitness of the environments de…ned in Examples 2 to 7. We also state and prove some intermediate results required for the auctions application.
Deliberative juries

Example 2 (continued)
Proposition 5 The environment ( ; R) in Example 2 is knit.
Proof. To prove knitness we just need to combine the following two results.
(1) Consider a pair formed by (A; ) for any 2 where j = (b j ; s j ) for each j 2 N . Let 0 2 be such that 0 1 = (l; i) and 0 j = (h; i) for any j 2 N nf1g. We now de…ne the sequence S to sequentially go from type pro…le to type pro…le 0 by successively changing the type of the agents in S while preserving A-satisfactoriness. First change, one by one and in any order, agents'signals from s j 6 = i to i. By de…nition of l and h, in each of the above changes, the induced preferences of the agent changing her type is an A-monotonic transform of her previous preferences (sometimes an A-reshu-ing).
Observe that by de…nition of the preference functions, the following condition is satis…ed: if b s j = i for all j 2 N , all jurors prefer A to C for any b b j 2 B. We now change, one by one and in any order, each agent's b j 6 = h from b j to h for any j 2 N nf1g and from b 1 6 = l to l in the case of agent 1. By the observation made just above, in each of these changes, the induced preferences of each agent is the same and therefore they are an A-reshu-ing of their previous preferences. Then, we have de…ned S such that leads to 0 through S and the passage from to 0 is A-satisfactory. (2) Consider a pair (C; ) for any 2 where j = (b j ; s j ) for each j 2 N . We now de…ne the sequence S to go from type pro…le to 0 above by successively changing the type of the agents in S while preserving C-satisfactoriness. First change, one by one and in any order, agents from s j 6 = g to g. By de…nition of l and h, in each of the above changes, the induced preferences of the agent changing her type is a C-monotonic transform of her previous preferences (sometimes a C-reshu-ing). Observe that by de…nition of the preference function, the following property is satis…ed: if b s j = g for all j 2 N , all jurors prefer C to A for any b b j 2 B. We now change one by one, and in any order, each agent's b j 6 = h from b j to h for any j 2 N nf1g and from b 1 6 = l to l in the case of agent 1. By the observation made just above, in each of these steps, the preferences of the agents stay the same and therefore they are a C-reshu-ing of their previous ones. After that, we change the signal of the agent 1 from g to i. This implies that the preferences of agent 1 remain identical, but those of all others go from C preferred to A, to A preferred to C, given that b j = h for any j 2 N nf1g. Finally, we change the type of the rest of the agents one by one from g to i. In each one of these steps the preferences of the agent that moves is still A preferred to C. The passage from to 0 is C-satisfactory by construction.
Example 3 (continued)
Before engaging in the proof that the environment in Example 3 is partially knit (see Proposition 6), we develop the argument for a particular example.
Consider a particular pair of types and alternatives, (A; ) and (C; e ) where = ((u; g); (u; i); (m; g)) and e = ((m; i); (u; i); (u; g)). Let 0 = ((m; i); (u; i); (m; g)). The pro…les of preferences they induce are shown in Table 6 . Table 6 : Agents'preferences induced by ; e ; and 0 , respectively.
We can check that C( ; C; A) = C( ; C; A) = f1; 3g and e 2 = 2 (that is, requirements in De…nition 6 are satis…ed). As shown in Table 7 below, it is possible to move from to 0 by successively changing, one by one, the type of the agents. In this case, agent 1 from (u; g) to (m; i). According to our notation, I(S) = f1g. Likewise, as shown in Table 8 below, we can move from e to 0 by successively changing, one by one, the type of some agents. In this case, agent 3 from (u; g) to (m; g), that is, I( e S) = f3g. In Table 7 , note that the preferences R 1 ( 0 ) of agent 1 are an A-monotonic transform of her previous ones, which also involve a change of those for agent 3. Similarly, notice that the preferences R 3 ( 0 ) of 3 in Table 8 are a C-reshu-ing of her previous ones. Table 8 : Induced agents'preferences given the speci…ed type changes from e to 0 .
In Tables 7 and 8 , we have illustrated the idea of partial knitness for two given type pro…les. We now show that any relevant pair of type pro…les are connected through two appropriate sequences.
Proposition 6
The environment ( ; R) in Example 3 is partially knit.
Proof. Take two pairs (A; ), (C; e ) 2 A such that C( ; C; A) = C( ; C; A) 6 = ?, #C( ; C; A) 2, and for j 2 N nC( ; C; A), e j = j . By de…nition, for all j 2 N , j = (b j ; s j ) and e j = ( e b j ; e s j ). We have to show that there exist 0 2 and sequences of types S and e S such that leads to 0 through S, e leads to 0 through e S, and the passages from and e to 0 are, respectively, A and C-satisfactory. Let 0 2 be such that 0 j = (b j ; g) for any j 2 C( ; C; A) and 0 j = j for any j 2 N nC( ; C; A). De…ne the sequence S = f(b k ; g)g, where k 2 C( ; C; A) and s k = i. Note that I(S) is either a singleton or empty. If the latter, let 0 be . By de…nition of the preference function in the example, if some agent j prefers C to A, the signal pro…le must be such that at most one agent k has signal i: s k = i. Thus, S is wellde…ned. Moreover, b k = m since for unswerving jurors to have C over A their signal must be g. And by de…nition of m increasing the support for g implies that preferences remain C over A for agent k (i.e. and A-reshu-ing) and will be C over A for the other agents. Therefore, we have de…ned S to go from to 0 through S and the passage is A-satisfactory. We now go from e to 0 by successively changing the type of the agents in C( ; C; A), one by one in any order, from to e s j 6 = g to g. This set of agents are those in I( e S). By de…nition of the preference function, if one agent changes her signal by increasing the support for a guilty veredict, then each agents'induced preferences remain either the same as before or change in favor of C. Thus, in each one of the above changes, the induced preferences of the agent changing her type is a C-monotonic transform of her previous ones (sometimes a C-reshu-ing). Now, take any two pairs (C; ), (A; e ) 2 A such that C( ; A; C) = C( ; A; C) 6 = ?, #C( ; A; C) 2, and for j 2 N nC( ; A; C), e j = j , a similar argument would work but de…ning 0 2 to be such that 0 j = (b j ; i) for any j 2 C( ; A; C) and 0 j = j for any j 2 N nC( ; A; C). De…ne the sequence S = f(b k ; i)g, where k 2 C( ; A; C) and s k = g. Note that I(S) is either a singleton or empty. If the latter, let 0 be . Again, by de…nition of the preference function in the example, if some agent j prefers A to C, the signal pro…le must be such that only one single agent, or at most two, have signal g. In the latter case, none of the two are agent j, and both have preferences C over A. Thus, S is well-de…ned. Moreover, by de…nition of m and u increasing if the single agent with signal g says i, that preferences of this agent and those of all other agents will be A over C. Therefore, we have de…ned S to go from to 0 through S and the passage is A-satisfactory. We now sequentially go from e to 0 by successively changing the type of the agents in C( ; A; C), one by one in any order, from to e s j 6 = i to i. This set of agents are those in I( e S). By de…nition of agents'preference function, if one agent changes her signal by increasing the support for veredict of innocence, then each agents'induced preferences remain either the same as before or change in favor of A. Thus, in each one of the above changes, the induced preferences of the agent changing her type is a A-monotonic transform of her previous ones (sometimes a A-reshu-ing).
Private goods without money
Example 4 (continued) We shall prove that the environment in this example is knit. In Example 4, we assume that the sets S ac and S ca are non-empty. Figure 1 provides a generic representation of these sets whose frontiers correspond to the pairs of signals leading to agents'indi¤erence curves over alternatives: f 2 = [0; 1] [0; 1] : xI i ( )yg. Since we have assumed that g i is increasing in both signals, agents' indi¤erence curves are strictly decreasing, and since S ac and S ca are non-empty the two curves will have an interior intersection. 23 We can now state and prove Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 The environment ( ; R) in Example 4 is knit.
Proof. Given any two pairs (x; ), (z; e ) 2 A we will show that there exist 0 , S, e S such that leads to 0 through S, e leads to 0 through e S and the passages are x and z-satisfactory. We choose 0 = (1; 1) independently of the two chosen pairs (x; ), (z; e ) 2 A . In de…ning the sequence S from to 0 with x as reference alternative, we distinguish two cases where we will end up analyzing all possible 2 . In particular, we cover the case where and e are the same. Case 1.
2 S ca [ S aa [ S 0 . First change the type of agent 1 from 1 6 = 1 to 1. Since the function g 1 is increasing in type 1, the preferences of agent 1 induced by this change are either an x-reshu-ing (if 2 S aa ) or an x-monotonic transform ( 2 S ca [ S 0 ) of her original ones. Then change the type of agent 2 from 2 to 1. Again, since the function g 2 is increasing in type 2, the preferences of agent 2 induced by this change are an x-reshu-ing of her original ones (see Picture 2.a in Figure 2) . Case 2. 2 S ac [ S cc . In this case we may not be able to change types of agents from i 6 = 1 to (1; 1) as directly as above. If is a type pro…le from which we could reach another one in S aa by letting the type of the …rst agent to be 1, we use the same argument as in Case 1: …rst change the type of agent 1 from 1 6 = 1 to 1. The preferences of agent 1 induced by this change are either an x-reshu-ing (if 2 S ac ) or an x-monotonic transform (if 2 S cc ) of her original ones. Then change the type of agent 2 from 2 to 1. The preferences of agent 2 induced by this change are an x-reshu-ing of her original ones. If not, before reaching this situation, the sequence S must start by previous changes of signals, at most one for each agent, as shown in Picture 2.b in Figure 2 , that keep us within the element of the partition where belongs to. The induced preferences resulting from these previous type changes remain unchanged.
To de…ne the sequence e S from e to 0 with z as reference alternative, we would follow a parallel construction to Cases 1 and 2 above. The relevant cases would now be Case 3: e 2 S ac [ S aa [ S 0 and Case 4: e 2 S ca [ S cc where we would consider all possible type pro…les e 2 including . The proof for the existence of the sequence e S would require a similar argument to those of Cases 1 and 2, respectively, but changing …rst agent 2's signal to 1 when required to get to S aa . See the graphical representation in Figure 3 . The construction of these passages proves that our environment is knit as we wanted to show.
Example 5 (continued)
Before engaging in the proof that the environment in Example 5 is partially knit, observe that the changes in the functions g i imply that the sets S ca = f 2 : zP 1 x and zP 2 xg and S ac = f 2 : xP 1 z and xP 2 zg are empty, and that S 0 is not a singleton. Due to the speci…c form of g i the indi¤erence set is L-shaped and thick, as shown in Figure 4 .
Proposition 8
The environment ( ; R) in Example 5 is partially knit.
Proof. Remember that type pro…les are signal pro…les. Thus, we identify s with . Take any two pairs (x; ), (z; e ) 2 A such that C( ; z; x) 6 = ? and #C( ; z; x) 2. These two conditions on imply that we must only consider 2 S ca , i.e. where agent 1 strictly prefers z to x and agent 2 is indi¤erent between x and z. De…ne 0 = e . We have to de…ne S such that leads to 0 = e through S and the passage is x-satisfactory. We distinguish two cases. See the graphical representation of both cases in Figure 5 . Case 1. e 2 S aa [ S ca . De…ne S = f e 1 ; e 2 g and I(S) = f1; 2g. Note that if e ; 2 S ca the proof is obvious since we move along the same set S ca and no agent preferences change. Suppose that e 2 S aa . We …rst increase the signal of agent 1 to 0 1 = e 1 . The induced preferences of agent 1 are an x-monotonic transform of her previous ones. Agent 2 turns to strictly prefer z to x, that is, zR 2 ( 0 1 ; 2 )x. Decrease or increase now agent 2's signal to 0 2 = e 2 . Note that agent 2's induced preferences are identical to her previous ones, thus, are obviously an x-reshu-ing of them. So we have gone from to 0 through adequate types changes with respect to x. Case 2. e 2 S cc [ S ac . De…ne S = f e 2 ; e 1 g and I(S) = f2; 1g. We …rst decrease the signal of agent 2 to 0 2 = e 2 . The induced preferences of agent 2 are an x-monotonic transform of her previous ones R 2 ( ) (since zP 2 ( )x while xP 2 ( 1 ; 0 2 )z). Agent 1 turns to have the same preferences as before, that is, zR 1 ( 1 ; 0 2 )x. Now, we decrease or increase agent 1's signal to 0 1 = e 1 . Note that agent 2's induced preferences are either identical to her previous ones (thus, obviously an x-reshu-ing of those) or an x-monotonic transform of R 1 ( 1 ; 0 2 ) (since zP 1 ( 1 ; 0 2 )x while zI 1 ( 0 1 )x). So, we have gone from to 0 through adequate changes of types with reference x. It would remain to consider any two pairs where (z; ), (x; e ) 2 A are such that C( ; x; z) 6 = ? and #C( ; x; z) 2, a symmetric and similar argument would work.
Finally, we show that the mechanism f veto x de…ned in Section 4.2 is non-constant, satis…es ex post incentive compatibility and respectfulness in the environment ( ; R) de…ned in Example 5. which implies, by Theorem 1, that the environment in Example 5 is not knit.
Lemma 1 f veto;x is non-constant, ex post incentive compatible, and respectful in the environment ( ; R) in Example 5.
Proof. Observe that, by de…nition, f veto x is non-constant and no agent can gain by changing her individual types, since she will either obtain the same or an indi¤erent one, when deviating, or else obtain her best outcome through by being truthful. Ex post group incentive compatibility is straightforward since changing both types it is impossible to weakly improve both agents, and at least on of them strictly: Note that either agent 1 or 2 strictly lose (we need to check 6 cases: 2 S aa and 0 2 S ca or viceversa; 2 S ac and 0 2 S ca or viceversa; and 2 S cc and 0 2 S ac or viceversa). To show that f veto x is respectful, note that the only way for agent 1 to remain indi¤erent according to her initial preferences R 1 ( ) and get a di¤erent outcome when changing her type is when 2 S ac and
Similarly, for agent 2, to remain indi¤erent and get a di¤erent outcome when changing her type 2 S 0 and 2
Auctions
Example 6 (continued) The following Lemma 2 is used in the proofs of Propositions 9 and 11 below.
Lemma 2 Let g k be non-decreasing in s k . For all s 2 , R k (s 0 k ; s k ) is a y-monotonic transform of R k (s) for all s 0 k < s k , k 2 N and y 2 A such that y k = (0; 0). Proof. Take s 2 , k 2 N and y 2 A such that y k = (0; 0) and s 
Proposition 9 The environment ( ; R) in Example 6 is knit.
Proof. Take any two pairs (x; ), (z; e ) 2 A . We must …nd 0 , sequences of types S and e S, such that the passage from to 0 through S is x-satisfactory and the passage from e to 0 through e S is z-satisfactory. Consider 0 = e s i ; s N nfig . We …rst propose a sequence of types S =s (t S = n) with I(S) de…ned as follows. We initially change, one by one, the signal of agents that do not get the good in x from s k to s k following the order of natural numbers. If there is one agent i left who was getting the good in x change her signal from s i to s i . In each step h 2 f1; :::; n 1g, by Lemma 2, we obtain that R h (m h ( ; S)) is an x-monotonic transform of R h (m h 1 ( ; S)) since no agent h gets the good in x. As for the last agent in the sequence, her preferences will not change when her signal goes from s i to s i due to assumption (b) of function g i . This completes our argument that the passage from to 0 through S is x-satisfactory. We could repeat exactly the same argument to show that the passage from e to 0 through e S is z-satisfactory after replacing the roles of by e and x by z.
Proposition 10 Any ex post group incentive compatible mechanism that always allocates the good to some agent is constant, if all auxiliary functions g i satisfy (b) and (c).
Proof. Take x = f (s) and without loss of generality suppose that agent 1 gets the good and pays p. We show that f is constant by the following steps.
Step 1. For any s = (s 1 ; s 2 ; :::s n ), such that s j 2 j for j 2 N nf1g, then agent 1 gets the good and pays p. Take any agent that does not get the good, without loss of generality, say agent 2. Consider s = (s 2 ; s N nf2g ) where s 2 < s 2 . By condition (c) of g i (that is, g i is strictly increasing in all s j , j 2 N ), g 2 (s 2 ; s N nf2g ) < g 2 (s). Ex post incentive compatibility implies that f 2 (s 2 ; s N nf2g ) = f 2 (s) = (0; 0). Take now any other agent k 2 N nf1; 2g. By condition (c), for each k 2 N nf1; 2g, g k (s 2 ; s N nf2g ) < g k (s). Thus, by ex post group incentive compatibility, we get that for any k 2 N nf1; 2g f k (s 2 ; s N nf2g ) = f k (s) = (0; 0). This implies that agent 1 gets the good at (s 2 ; s N nf2g ). Moreover, agent 1 pays the same price p. Otherwise, if p 0 < p, coalition N would pro…tably deviate from s to (s 2 ; s N nf2g ) since f 1 (s 2 ; s N nf2g ) = (1; p 0 )P 1 (s)f 1 (s) = (1; p). The other way around if p 0 > p. Repeating n 2 additional times the same argument, one for each agent j 2 N nf1; 2g, we obtain that for any s = (s 1 ; s 2 ; :::s n ), such that s j 2 j for j 2 N nf1g, agent 1 gets the good and pays p.
Step 2. For any s = (s 1 ; s N nf1g ), such that s 1 2 1 , then agent 1 gets the good and pays p. By condition (b) of g 1 , g 1 (s 1 ; s N nf1g ) = g 1 (s) for any s 1 2 1 . Thus, for any s 1 2 1 , agent 1's preferences R 1 (s 1 ; s N nf1g ) coincide with R 1 (s). In particular, R 1 (s 1 ; s N nf1g ) coincide with R 1 (s). By ex post incentive compatibility, for all s 1 2 1 , f 1 (s 1 ; s N nf1g )I 1 (s 1 ; s N nf1g )f 1 (s 1 ; s N nf1g ), being f 1 (s 1 ; s N nf1g ) = (1; p) by Step 1. If agent 1 gets the good at (s 1 ; s N nf1g ), since R 1 (s 1 ; s N nf1g ) coincide with R 1 (s 1 ; s N nf1g ), the price must be the same. That is, f 1 (s 1 ; s N nf1g ) = (1; p) and then the proof of Step 2 ends. Otherwise, take l 2 N nf1g such that f l (s 1 ; s N nf1g ) = (1; p l ). By condition (c) of g l , g l (s 1 ; s N nf1g ) < g l (s 1 ; s N nf1g ). Note that if p l < g l (s 1 ; s N nf1g ), coalition f1; lg can ex post pro…tably deviate at (s 1 ; s N nf1g ) via (s 1 ; s l ) (agent l would strictly gain while 1 remain indi¤erent). If p l g l (s 1 ; s N nf1g ), coalition f1; lg can ex post pro…tably deviate at (s 1 ; s N nf1g ) via (s 1 ; s l ) (agent l would strictly gain). Thus, we have shown that agent 1 gets the good and pays p at (s 1 ; s N nf1g ), for any s 1 2 1 .
Step 3. For any s 2 such that s 1 < s 1 and there exists l 2 N nf1g such that s l > s l , then agent 1 gets the good and pays p. Let C = fi 2 N nf1g : s i > s i g. First, observe that if agent 1 gets the good at s in Step 3, by ex post incentive compatibility, the price must be p. Otherwise, 1 could ex post pro…tably deviate at s via s 1 if p 0 > p, or at (s 1 ; s N nf1g ) via s 1 if p > p 0 . Consider the following two cases for which we obtain a contradiction.
Step 3.1. Agent k 2 N nf1g gets the good at s and s k > s k . Take an agent j 2 Cnfkg who does not get the good at s and change her type from s j to s j . If Cnfkg is empty, we have that f k (s k ; s N nfkg ) = (1; p 0 ), and by applying the same argument as in Step 2 we would get f k (s) = (1; p 0 ), which contradicts the reasoning in Step 2 when applied to s. Otherwise, by condition (c) of g j , g j (s j ; s N nfjg ) < g j (s j ; s N nfjg ). By ex post incentive compatibility, f j (s) = f j (s j ; s N nfjg ) = (0; 0). Again, if Cnfk; jg is empty, we have that f k (s k ; s N nfkg ) = (1; p 0 ) and by applying the same argument as in Step 2 we would get f k (s) = (1; p 0 ) which contradicts Step 2 applied to s. Otherwise, take j 0 2 Cnfk; jg, and by condition (c) of g j 0 , g j 0 (s j ; s N nfjg ) < g j 0 (s j ; s N nfjg ). If for any j 0 2 N nfkg, f j 0 (s j ; s N nfjg ) = f j 0 (s j ; s N nfjg ) = (0; 0), we obtain that f k (s j ; s N nfjg ) = (1; p 0 ) and we repeat the same argument in Step 3.1 for l 2 Cnfk; jg. If for some j 0 , f j 0 (s j ; s N nfjg ) 6 = (0; 0), we would get a contradiction to ex post group incentive compatibility: fj; j 0 g would pro…tably deviate from (s j ; s N nfjg ) via (s j ;
. By repeating the same argument, and changing one by one the signal from s l to s l for each l 2 Cnfkg, we obtain that f k (s k ; s N nfkg ) = (1; p 0 ). Now, by using a similar argument as the one in Step 2 by replacing agent 1 by k, we can show that f k (s) = (1; p 0 ) which is a contradiction to Step 2. Step 3.2. Agent k 2 N nf1g gets the good at s and s k = s k . We obtain a contradiction using an argument similar to the one in Step 3.1. Thus, agent 1 gets the good at any s and pays p.
Example 7 (continued)
The following Lemma 3 is used in the proof of Proposition 11.
Proof. Take s 2 , k 2 N and y 2 A such that y k = (1; p), p 0 and s 
Proposition 11 The environment ( ; R) in Example 7 is partially knit.
Proof. Take any two pairs (x; ), (z; e ) 2 A such that C( ; z; x) 6 = ;, #C( ; z; x) = 2. Some agent must get the good either in x or in z, otherwise C( ; z; x) = ;.
First, assume that the same agent i gets the good both in x and in z. De…ne 0 = (maxfs i ; e s i g, minfs j ; e s j g), S = e S = fmaxfs i ; e s i g, minfs j ; e s j gg where I(S) = I( e S) = fi; jg. Note that for step h = 1, either s i(S;1) = s i( e S;1) = s i if s i > e s i or s i(S;1) = s i( e S;1) = e s i if s i < e s i . Thus, either because there is no signal change or by Lemma 3, we obtain that R i (m 1 ( ; S)) is an x-monotonic transform of R i (m 0 ( ; S)) and R i (m 1 ( e ; e S)) is an z-monotonic transform of R i (m 0 ( e ; e S)). Note that for step 2, either s i(S;h) = s i( e S;h) = s j if s j < e s j or s i(S;h) = s i( e S;h) = e s j if s j > e s j . Thus, either because there is no signal change or by Lemma 2, we obtain in step 2 that R j (m 2 ( ; S)) is an x-monotonic transform of R j (m 1 ( ; S)) and R j (m 2 ( e ; e S)) is a z-monotonic transform of R j (m 1 ( e ; e S)). Thus, the passage from to 0 through S is x-satisfactory, and that from e to 0 through e S is z-satisfactory.
Second, suppose that di¤erent agents get the good in x and z. Without loss of generality, say that agent 1 gets the good in x while agent 2 gets it in z. Thus, alternatives x and z are such that x 1 = (1; p x ), z 1 = (0; 0), x 2 = (0; 0), z 2 = (1; p z ). Now, we consider three cases, and for each one we de…ne 0 and the sequences of types S and e S, such that the passage from to 0 through S is x-satisfactory and the passage from e to 0 through e S is z-satisfactory. Case 1. = (0; 1). The conditions C( ; z; x) 6 = ; and C( ; z; x) = N are satis…ed since p x > l and p z > l. For any e de…ne 0 = e . If e = (1; 1), let S = f i(S;1) = 1g, I(S) = f1g, if e = (0; 0), let S = f i(S;1) = 0g, I(S) = f2g, and if e = (1; 0), let S = f i(S;1) = 1; i(S;2) = 0g, I(S) = f1; 2g. By applying Lemma 3, Lemma 2 or both, respectively, we prove that the passage from to e = 0 through S is x-satisfactory. Case 2. = (1; 1). For conditions C( ; z; x) 6 = ; and C( ; z; x) = N to hold we must have either p x > m and p z m, or p z < m and p x m: Suppose that the former holds. Otherwise, a similar proof would follow. If e = (0; 1), let 0 = e and de…ne S = f i(S;1) = 0g, I(S) = f1g, and observe that R 1 (m 1 ( ; S)) is an x-reshu-ing of R 1 ( ) since p x > m and p z m. If e = (1; 0), let 0 = e and de…ne S = f i(S;1) = 0g, I(S) = f2g, and observe that R 2 (m 1 ( ; S)) is an x-monotonic transform of R 2 ( ) by Lemma 2. If e = (0; 0), let 0 = (0; 1) and de…ne S = f i(S;1) = 0g, I(S) = f1g, e S = f i( e S;1) = 1g, I( e S) = f2g. Again, observe that R 1 (m 1 ( ; S)) is an x-reshu-ing of R 1 ( ) since p x > m and p z m. Moreover, R 2 (m 1 ( e ; e S)) is a z-monotonic transform of R 2 ( e ) since l < p z m. Case 3. = (0; 0) and = (1; 0). For both , g 2 ( ) = l. Since 2 2 C( ; z; x) then p z l, contradicting our hypothesis.
Third, the last remaining possibility is that in only one of the two alternatives, x or z, some agent gets the good. Without loss of generality, suppose that agent 1 gets the good in x. Note that for conditions C( ; z; x) 6 = ; and C( ; z; x) = N to hold, for any 2 , 1 2 C( ; z; x) since 2 2 C( ; z; x). Now, we consider four cases, and for each one we de…ne 0 and the sequences of types S and e S, such that the passage from to 0 through S is x-satisfactory and the passage from e to 0 through e S is z-satisfactory. Case 4. = (0; 1). Since 1 2 C( ; z; x), p x > l must be satis…ed. For any e de…ne 0 = e . If e = (1; 1), let S = f i(S;1) = 1g and I(S) = f1g, if e = (0; 0), let S = f i(S;1) = 0g and I(S) = f2g, and if e = (1; 0), let S = f i(S;1) = 1; i(S;2) = 0g and I(S) = f1; 2g. By applying either Lemma 3, Lemma 2 or both consecutively in this order, we prove that the passage from to e = 0 through S is x-satisfactory. Case 5. = (1; 1). Since 1 2 C( ; z; x), p x > m must be satis…ed. If e = (0; 1), let 0 = e and de…ne S = f i(S;1) = 0g, I(S) = f1g, and observe that R 1 (m 1 ( ; S)) is an x-reshu-ing of R 1 ( ) since p x > m. If e = (1; 0), let 0 = e and de…ne S = f i(S;1) = 1g, I(S) = f2g, and observe that R 2 (m 1 ( ; S)) is an x-monotonic transform of R 2 ( ) by Lemma 2. If e = (0; 0), let 0 = e and de…ne S = f i(S;1) = 0; i( e S;2) = 0g, I(S) = f1; 2g. Again, observe that R 1 (m 1 ( ; S)) is an x-reshu-ing of R 1 ( ) since p x > m. Moreover, R 2 (m 2 ( ; S)) is an x-monotonic transform of R 2 (m 1 ( ; S)) by Lemma 2. Case 6. = (0; 0). Since 1 2 C( ; z; x), p x > l must be satis…ed. If e = (0; 1), let 0 = and de…ne e S = f i( e S;1) = 0g, I( e S) = f2g, and observe that R 2 (m 1 ( e ; e S)) is a z-monotonic transform of R 2 ( e ) by Lemma 2. If e = (1; 0), let 0 = and de…ne e S = f i( e S;1) = 0g, I( e S) = f1g, and observe that R 1 (m 1 ( e ; e S)) is a z-monotonic transform of R 1 ( e ) by Lemma 2. If e = (1; 1), let 0 = and de…ne e S = f i( e S;1) = 0; i( e S;2) = 0g, I(S) = f2; 1g, and observe that, by Lemma 2, R 2 (m 1 ( e ; e S)) is a z-monotonic transform of R 2 ( e ) and R 1 (m 2 ( e ; e S)) is a z-monotonic transform of R 1 (m 1 ( e ; e S)). Case 7. = (1; 0). Since 1 2 C( ; z; x), p x > h must be satis…ed. If e = (0; 0), let 0 = e = (0; 0) and de…ne S = f i(S;1) = 0g, I(S) = f1g, and observe that R 1 (m 1 ( ; S)) is an x-reshu-ing of R 1 ( ) since p x > h. If e = (0; 1), let 0 = (0; 0) and de…ne S = f i(S;1) = 0g and I(S) = f1g, e S = f i( e S;1) = 0g and I( e S) = f2g. Observe that R 1 (m 1 ( ; S)) is an x-reshu-ing of R 1 ( ) since p x > h. Moreover, R 2 (m 2 ( e ; e S)) is a z-monotonic transform of R 2 (m 1 ( e ; e S)) by Lemma 2.
If e = (1; 1), let 0 = (0; 0) and de…ne S = f i(S;1) = 0g and I(S) = f1g, e S = f i( e S;1) = 0; i( e S;2) = 0g and I( e S) = f1; 2g. Again, observe that R 1 (m 1 ( ; S)) is an x-reshu-ing of R 1 ( ) since p x > m. Moreover, R 1 (m 1 ( e ; e S)) is a z-monotonic transform of R 1 ( e ) and R 2 (m 2 ( e ; e S)) is a z-monotonic transform of R 2 (m 1 ( e ; e S)) by Lemma 2.
Lemma 4 f p;p 0 is non-constant, ex post incentive compatible, and respectful in the environment ( ; R) in Example 7.
Proof. By de…nition f p;p 0 is not constant. To show that f p;p 0 is ex post incentive compatible we …rst observe that agent 1 can never strictly gain by deviating from any s 2 . For any s 2 2 2 , since g 1 (0; s 2 )) = l, g 1 (1; s 2 ) 2 fm; hg, and p 2 (l; m), then f 1 (0; s 2 )P 1 (0; s 2 )f 1 (1; s 2 ) and f 1 (1; s 2 )P 1 (1; s 2 )f 1 (0; s 2 ) where f 1 (0; s 2 ) = (0; 0) and f 1 (1; s 2 ) = (1; p). Similarly, we can show that agent 2 can never strictly gain by deviating from any s 2 . For any s 1 2 1 , since g 2 (s 1 ; 0) = l, g 2 (s 1 ; 1) 2 fm; hg, and p 0 2 (l; m), then f 2 (s 1 ; 0)R 2 (s 1 ; 0)f 2 (s 1 ; 1) and f 2 (s 1 ; 1)R 2 (s 1 ; 1)f 2 (s 1 ; 0) where f 2 (s 1 ; 0) = (0; 0) and f 2 (s 1 ; 1) 2 f(0; 0); (1; p 0 )g. To check respectfulness, observe that agent 1 is not indi¤erent between any pair of outcomes obtained when she is the only one changing types. As for agent 2, observe that the same holds if s 1 = 0. For s 1 = 1, f (1; 0) = f (1; 1). Thus, respectfulness holds.
Remark 2
The following Example and Lemma justify our observation in Remark 2. Example 8 For simplicity, let N = f1; 2g, i = f0; 1g for all i 2 N and l; m; h 2 R + with 0 = l < m < h. The agent's preference function is de…ned as in the general framework but will now be based on a di¤erent auxiliary function that takes three possible values, low, medium and high.
More formally, Observe that for each agent i, g i satis…es (a) and the following condition: (e) g i is non-decreasing in s j , for all j 2 N nfig.
Condition (e) establishes that the valuation of the good by agent i depends positively on other agents'signals. Now, we assert that the environment in Example 8 is neither knit nor partially knit. To do so, we de…ne below a non-constant, ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanism in such environment that is not ex post group incentive compatible. Therefore, by Theorem 1, the environment is not partially knit.
A mechanism f h;m is such that agent 1 gets the good and pays h if the signal of agent 2 is 0 or both agents'signals are 1 and agent 2 gets the good and pays m otherwise. Formally, for 2 f0; Lemma 5 f h;m is non-constant, ex post incentive compatible, and respectful but it violates ex post group incentive compatibility in the environment ( ; R) in Example 8.
Proof. To check ex post incentive compatibility just observe that no single agent can strictly gain by unilateral deviations. To check respectfulness, we need to consider s and s 0 such that f (s) 6 = f (s 0 ), where only one agent changes her type and remains indi¤erent. Two cases need to be checked. First, let s = (1; 1), s 0 = (0; 1). Observe that neither R 1 (0; 1) is a f (1; 1)-monotonic transform of R 1 (1; 1) nor R 1 (1; 1) is a f (0; 1)-monotonic transform of R 1 (0; 1). Second, let s = (0; 1) and s 0 = (0; 0). Again, neither R 2 (0; 0) is a f (0; 1)-monotonic transform of R 2 (0; 1) nor R 2 (0; 1) is a f (0; 0)-monotonic transform of R 2 (0; 0). Thus these cases do not need to be considered and respectfulness holds. To check that f h;m violates ex post group incentive compatibility, consider s = (1; 1), C = N , s 0 C = (0; 1). Note that (0; 0) = f 1 (0; 1)I 1 (1; 1)f 1 (1; 1) = (1; h) and (1; m) = f 2 (0; 1)P 2 (1; 1)f 2 (1; 1) = (0; 0) which means that coalition N can ex post pro…tably deviate under mechanism f at s 2 via s 0 C .
